Global Issues: R2P and Libyan ‘No-Fly Zone’ - The Arguments

There is an excellent article in the Guardian - A no-fly zone over Libya? The case for and against - which clearly sets out the respective arguments for and against creating a ‘No-Fly Zone’ in Libya. However, of particular utility for those studying Global Issues is that the article also explores the arguments around the idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the R2P and also gives a bit of historical background as to how the doctine arouse. The article, which is a must read in full, begins:

“In three short words, “no-fly zone” sums up the latest moral quandary for the world on where and when the global responsibility to save lives should trump the supposed sanctity of national borders.

After the horrors of Rwanda and Bosnia, where the international community looked on with hand-wringing impotence at mass slaughter carried out under its collective nose, there was a wave of enthusiasm in the late 1990s for the idea that the international community had a “responsibility to protect” populations if national governments failed….....”

Here are the arguments for and against a No-Fly Zone:

FOR

• It will stop Gaddafi bombing civilians, and thereby prevent a potential atrocity.

• It will stop Gaddafi crushing the rebellion, and so prevent reprisal massacres. A show of international resolve would give encouragement to waverers in the pro-government ranks and could persuade the Libyan despot to negotiate his departure.

• It will not be destabilising as it does not require putting western forces on Libyan territory

• Without decisive western involvement, a prolonged conflict – and the humanitarian disaster that would come with it – would destabilise the region and bring a refugee wave to the shores of southern Europe. It would provide an opening for al-Qaida and other extremists to claim the west had once more let the Arab people down.

• By upholding the principle of the international community’s responsibility to protect civilians around the world, a no-fly zone will deter other embattled dictators from massacring their opponents as a way of clinging to power.

• Support and involvement of the Arab world would prevent it appearing a purely western intervention and help cement a new western partnership with the democratising Arab world.

AGAINST
• It will not stop the worst of the violence, which is being inflicted by tanks and artillery. Nor will it necessarily stop helicopters, which could be a more potent threat than warplanes.

• It may be too late to save the rebellion and could allow Gaddafi to rally national sentiment in the face of western interference, providing political cover for a witch-hunt.

• A no-fly zone cannot be done without bombing Libyan air-defences (to make the skies safe for US and allied pilots) and that could cause civilian casualties, potentially turning western interveners into villains.

• A no-fly zone would most likely be the beginning of western military intervention rather than the end. Could the international community stand by if atrocities were committed beneath its patrolling planes? It could lead inexorably to air strikes, arming the rebels and a host of unintended consequences.

• A no-fly zone would taint not just the Libyan rebels, but the whole Arab pro-democracy movement, as western stooges, sapping the uprising of its home-grown vitality. The Arab League vote in favour represented the region’s elites. The “Arab street” would be far more hostile to western intervention, especially if civilians were harmed. Al-Qaida could exploit the consequent turmoil to present itself as the defender of Arab sovereignty and pride.

• It would take much-needed resources away from Afghanistan and create demand from other rebels across the region for similar treatment.