A Decline of Responsibility and Principles?

Mike Simpson (Bradford Grammar School) looks at the continued decline of individual ministerial responsibility and the traditional principles of the Civil Service.A printable version of this article appears in the latest edition of FPTP - tutor2u's digital magazine for AS & A2 Politics students.

A central aspect of the core executive is the relationship between the minister and the civil servants in their department. Ministers are the elected politicians who are members of the government; civil servants are there to help the minister implement the policies of that government. It is said that ministers decide and civil servants execute; that civil servants are on tap and ministers on top.

In order to assist the Civil Service in that purpose, several key principles come into play which might be regarded as the corner stone of the executive and the British Constitution.

• Neutrality allows the Civil Service to permanently serve governments whatever their political outlook.
• Similarly, their anonymity ensures that they can give impartial advice to a minister. The scrutiny function of Parliament is performed via the mechanism of individual ministerial responsibility. It is the minister who answers to Parliament for the work of a department. They can take the credit when things go well and the blame when things go wrong. These principles however have gradually been eroded over time.

The most recent assault on these traditional characteristics has come from the minister in charge of Civil Service reform, Francis Maude.

1.Anonymity has been undermined as he has sought to blame the Civil Service directly over problems implementing the universal credit which one of the key reforms in the Department of Work and Pensions.

2.Individual Ministerial Responsibility would be weakened if, as he has argued, Civil Servants in charge of big projects were to be directly answerable to Parliament. Maude argues that civil servants should have to face questioning from relevant select committees.

3.He has also suggested that senior civil servants be appointed by the minister. This would end effectively end the neutrality of the Civil Service and their permanence. This would be a politicisation of the Civil Service along the lines of the “spoils system” in the USA. Civil Servants appointed by a minister would be unlikely to be able to serve another government of a different political persuasion.

4.Criticisms were also levelled against the ability of the Civil Service to assist government. Maude argued that they are too conservative and reluctant to implement change. He cited a culture that was very “rigid and hierarchical which stifled initiative.” This explains why ministers may be more likely to rely on their own special advisors. In the present climate of austerity economics with the need for massive cuts in the service on the grounds of “efficiency gains”, Maude felt that Civil Servants were fighting a rear-guard battle in order to save their own skin which was frustrating the government. He argued “A lot of ministers don’t know a lot of things going on in their department because there’s no way you’ll find out.”

Signs of a growing rift between the service and the decline of individual ministerial responsibility have been evident for some time. Theresa May blamed the Civil Service / Border Control Agency over immigration failures. Ministers refused to accept responsibility for the West Coast Line bid fiasco.

Civil servants such as Lord Butler, the former head of the Service, has eluded that blame lies with ministers and their inability to govern effectively. He argues constant criticism will not be conducive to an effective working relationship between the two.

Questions.

• Is the Civil Service too conservative or too Conservative?
• How important are conventions as a source of the British Constitution?
• When do ministers resign?