What is the divorce of ownership from control in modern businesses?

The divorce of ownership from control refers to a situation where the owners of a company, such as its shareholders, do not have direct control over the company's operations and management. Instead, the day-to-day management and decision-making power rests with a separate group of individuals, such as the company's executives or board of directors.

Here are some examples of the divorce of ownership from control:

1. Publicly traded companies: When a company goes public and sells shares to the public, ownership is spread among many different shareholders. However, these shareholders typically do not have direct control over the company's operations, as day-to-day management is handled by the company's executives and board of directors.
2. Family-owned businesses: In some cases, a family may own a business, but not all members of the family are involved in the day-to-day management. Instead, a small group of family members or non-family executives may have control over the company's operations.
3. Private equity firms: Private equity firms acquire ownership stakes in companies, but typically do not get involved in the day-to-day management. Instead, they often hire their own executives to run the company and make strategic decisions.
4. Joint ventures: When two or more companies form a joint venture, ownership and control is split among the companies. However, one company may have more control over the joint venture's operations, depending on the terms of the agreement.

In all of these examples, there is a separation between ownership and control, with different groups of individuals having control over the company's operations and decision-making power.

How is the divorce of ownership from control linked to the principal agent problem?

The divorce of ownership from control is closely linked to the principal-agent problem, which is a common issue in corporate governance. The principal-agent problem arises when the owners of a company, such as shareholders, hire managers to make decisions and act on their behalf.

However, the managers may have different goals and incentives than the owners, leading to a conflict of interest.

In the context of the divorce of ownership from control, the principal-agent problem arises because the owners of a company, such as shareholders, are the principals, while the managers or executives who control the day-to-day operations of the company are the agents. The agents may not always act in the best interests of the principals, as they may have their own goals and incentives.

For example, executives may prioritize their own compensation or personal goals over maximizing shareholder value. In some cases, managers may make decisions that benefit themselves, such as investing in projects that boost their own reputation or power, rather than projects that are in the best interests of shareholders.

The principal-agent problem can lead to a misalignment of incentives, with agents pursuing their own interests at the expense of the principals. This can create a conflict between the owners and managers of a company, and may result in poor decision-making and reduced shareholder value.

In order to address the principal-agent problem, companies may implement various governance mechanisms, such as executive compensation plans that align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, board oversight, and shareholder engagement.